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ABSTRACT 
To ameliorate the quality of protection provided by intrusion 
detection systems (IDS) we strongly need more effective 
evaluation and testing procedures. Evaluating an IDS against all 
known and unknown attacks is probably impossible. Nevertheless, 
a sensible selection of representative attacks is necessary to obtain 
an unbiased evaluation of such systems. To help in this selection, 
this paper suggests applying the same approach as in software 
testing: to overcome the problem of an unmanageably large set of 
possible inputs, software testers usually divide the data input 
domain into categories (or equivalence classes), and select 
representative instances from each category as test cases. We 
believe that the same principle could be applied to IDS testing if 
we have a reasonable classification. In this paper we make a 
thorough analysis of existing attack classifications in order to 
determine whether they could be helpful in selecting attack test 
cases. Based on our analysis, we construct a new scheme to 
classify attacks relying on those attributes that appear to be the 
best classification criteria. The proposed classification is mainly 
intended to be used for testing and evaluating IDS although it can 
be used for other purposes such as incident handling and intrusion 
reporting. We also apply the Classification Tree Method (CTM) 
to select attack test cases. As far as we know, this is the first time 
that this method is applied for this purpose.  
General Terms 
Security 
Keywords 
Intrusion Detection Systems, Attack, Evaluation, Test, 
classification. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Known evaluations of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) suffer 
important shortcomings and often produce misleading results for 
several reasons [1, 2]. These defects are mainly due to (1) 
unsystematic approaches, (2) non-representative test cases, (3) 
incorrect metrics and (4) absence of sensitivity analysis on test 
datasets. It is worth noting that the aforementioned critiques are 
globally true whatever the context of the evaluation: as 
benchmarking with respect to a specific environment, as 
conformance test, as self-assessment of operational IDS, as test 
during development cycle, etc. 
In order to provide a reasonable, complete solution and to obtain 
an unbiased evaluation, these problems should be eliminated or at 
least reduced. To resolve the problem of misleading ad-hoc 
evaluations, we derived a systematic methodology to evaluate IDS 
in [3]. In this paper, we focus on the second problem: the 
selection of representative test cases.  
Intrusion Detection Systems should aim at detecting all attacks 
that either already exist or will be created in the future. In order to 
determine the superiority of an IDS and its quality of detection, it 
should be evaluated and tested against these classes of attacks. 
However, the attack space is too large to be enumerated and used 
as a dataset, whatever it is, for practical reasons. With this huge 
number of possible inputs to the IDS (i.e., attacks), the challenge 
resides in: (1) selecting a reasonably small number of attack test 
cases that provide a good representation of all possible inputs; (2) 
ensuring a good coverage to activate and exercise the different 
parts of the IDS.  
In this work we borrowed two important concepts from software 
testing: the equivalence classes and the input parameter modeling. 
The underlying assumption of these techniques is that input 
instances from the same category have similar effects and thus 
generate similar outputs or results. Therefore, tests could be 
performed against only one or few representative samples from 
each equivalence class instead of the whole class. 
To achieve that, we have conducted a thorough analysis of 
existing attack and vulnerability classifications to figure out their 
strengths and weaknesses. We studied the attributes of each 
taxonomy to determine how they could be relevant to our purpose 
(i.e., to produce an IDS evaluation-oriented classification). We 
eliminated the meaningless ones and combined several attributes 
from different classifications to produce a new classification. 
Moreover, based on this classification scheme, we applied the 
Classification Tree Method (CTM) [4, 17] in order to get an easy, 
semi-automatic selection of attack test cases. For this purpose, we 
initially used a tool called CTE [4], which can be used for generic 
application of the classification tree method. Then we began the 
development of a security specific tool similar to CTE which is 
also aware of existing attacks and exploits. 
Such work should produce several benefits: first, it will reduce the 
attack test cases included in test datasets and make the test process 
more manageable. Second, it enhances the test dataset coverage of 
the attack domain space, as we can know those attack types 
against which the IDS is tested or not tested. Third, it yields a 
better knowledge of the domain as well as it enhances the 
understanding of new attack instances.  
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we analyze 
different attack taxonomies and then discuss the reasons that make 
these classifications helpless for the selection of attack test cases, 
in Section 3. We introduce our classification which is intended to 
be used for IDS evaluation and testing in Section 4. Then, we 
propose a complementary approach for selecting attack test cases 
in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 draws a conclusion. 
2. ANALYSIS OF AVAILABLE 
CLASSIFICATIONS 
The problem of attack classification has attracted many 
researchers in the domain. However, they did not share the same 
objective. In order to not re-invent the wheel, we firstly examined 
the existing taxonomies. In the next two sections, we analyze 
several of them to see if one can match our needs and can be 
employed for IDS evaluation and testing. The detailed description 
of each taxonomy is out of the scope of this paper (refer to the [5] 
for more details). 
We begin by Bishop’s Vulnerability taxonomy [6]: Although this 
taxonomy is intended for classifying vulnerabilities, it might be 
useful to present it briefly because of its useful attributes (or 
axes). It has six axes: The nature of the flaw, the time of 
introduction of the vulnerability, the exploitation domain (i.e., the 
consequences of exploitation), the effect domain (what is 
affected?), the minimum number of components essential to 
exploit the vulnerability and the source of identification of the 
vulnerability. 
Another interesting work is the two-dimension taxonomy that was 
introduced in [7]. It extends Neuman and Parker’s taxonomy that 
have only the technique dimension [8] by adding the result 
dimension. It was built around attacks experimented by internal 
users (students of computer science class). The weak point of this 
classification is that it considers attacks launched by students in 
an undergraduate class. Therefore it ignores an important part of 
the attack domain space which consists of more sophisticated 
techniques by more experienced attackers. 
Kumar had classified attacks according to four attributes of 
pattern or signature: existence, sequence, interval and duration 
[9].  
Weber’s taxonomy is based on three dimensions: the required 
level of privilege to conduct the attack, the mean by which the 
attack proceeded (e.g., exploiting a software bug) and the 
intended effect (e.g., a denial of service) [10]. 
DARPA’s taxonomy is a reduced version of Weber’s taxonomy. It 
considers only the effect dimension. Attacks were divided into 
five categories: Remote to Local, (R2L), User to Root (U2R), 
probe or scan and Denial of Service (DoS), [11], [12]. 
Howard’s taxonomy [13] is based on the attack process rather 
than the attack itself. The attack process was divided into stages:  
1. attacker (who is she/he? a simple hacker or a terrorist), 
2. tool (what the attacker uses; a script kiddy or a specialized 
tool), 
3. vulnerability (through implementation, configuration or 
design vulnerability), 
4. access (what access is obtained; unauthorized access to files, 
objects or processes), 
5. results of attack (exposure or corruption of data) and 
6. attack objectives (e.g., destroy data, obtain information). 
Simon Hansman’s taxonomy [14] has four dimensions: attack 
vector (i.e., attack type: virus, worm, DoS, etc.), attack target 
(e.g., OS, application, network protocol), exploited vulnerability 
and effects of attack. The attack vector consists of the means by 
which the attack reaches its target. 
The so called defense-centric taxonomy was introduced in [15] to 
serve network administrators in defending their own systems. It 
classifies attacks according to attack manifestations in system 
calls as seen by anomaly HIDS (i.e., anomaly host based intrusion 
detection systems). The four features, or dimensions, of interest 
are: (1) foreign symbol: the system call that appears when an 
attack is executed and never appears in normal operation. (2) 
Minimal formal sequence: the manifestations sequence that 
appears in the attack and do not appear in the normal operation, 
albeit all its subsequences appear in the normal operation. (3) 
Dormant sequence: the manifestations that partially matches a 
subsequence in the normal operation. (4) Non-anomalous 
sequence: manifestations that fully match sequences in the normal 
operation. 
The taxonomy found in [16] was created for the purpose of 
analyzing IDS. It classifies activities that could be relevant to IDS 
instead of classifying attacks directly. An analytic evaluation of 
IDS was later established on it to determine its detection 
capabilities in front of attack classes. The underlying model of the 
observable manifestations distinguishes dynamic characteristics 
from static characteristics of activities. Static characteristics are 
split further to separate the characteristics related to interface 
objects and those related to affected objects. Similarly, dynamic 
characteristics are developed into three sub-characteristics: 
communication features, method invocation characteristics and 
other additional attributes. Then, an attack could be described by 
five parameters: interface object, affected object, communication, 
invocation method and other minor attributes. In total, it contains 
24 interface objects, 10 affected objects, 2 communication 
characteristics, 5 method invocations and 4 minor attributes. 
Before presenting our own classification in section 5, we will 
discuss in the next section the limitations of the previous 
classifications and analyze their attributes in order to select only 
the evaluation-relevant ones. 
3. DISCUSSION 
The previous attack taxonomies may have different viewpoints. 
One can notice that they are generally based on attributes of attack 
and/or vulnerability. Although using inconsistent attribute names, 
we can distinguish and cite the following ones amongst the used 
attributes: 
1. Type of attack: virus, worm, trojan horse, DoS (Denial of 
Service), etc.; 
2. Detection technique: pattern matching, statistical approach, 
etc.; 
3. Signature: observed attack pattern, attack sequence pattern; 
4. Tool: physical, user command, script, tool kit, etc.; 
5. Target : OS, network protocol, application, service, process; 
6. Results: Data corruption, exposure of information, denial of 
service; 
7. Gained Access: root access, user access; 
8. Preconditions: existence of particular versions of software by 
example; 
9. Vulnerability: buffer overflow, weak password, inappropriate 
configuration, 
10. Objective : terrorism, political gain, financial gain, self 
proving;  
11. Attacker location: external, internal; 
12. Security property: confidentiality, integrity, availability. 
Taxonomies could be established upon a single attribute. Then the 
resulting categories will contain attacks that are widely different 
and share neither clear features nor strong relationships. For this 
reason, multi-dimension taxonomies have been formed by 
combining several attributes to obtain more distinctive categories 
that regroup more similar attacks. Almost all attack taxonomies 
suffer from the problem of mutual exclusivity. It was interpreted 
by the nature of sophisticated attacks as being composed of 
several blended attacks. However, this interpretation overlooked 
the real cause. If we examine classifications’ 
attributes/dimensions, they are often not clearly defined and hence 
properties of attacks are not clearly separated. By example, 
putting both buffer overflow and DoS as classes bellow the same 
attribute will inevitably lead to a mutual exclusive problem 
because a buffer overflow attack may cause a DoS. 
We also noticed that most of the aforementioned classifications 
are attacker-centric where they take the attacker viewpoint. Thus, 
they usually ignore or mask significant attack features, as seen by 
an IDS itself or system owners. By contrast, both the taxonomies 
of [15] and [16] are IDS-centric or defense-centric.  
The categorization found in [16] was principally created for the 
analysis of IDS. It considers more details about attacks in terms of 
IDS characteristics. Although it seems to be more adapted for use 
in IDS evaluation and testing, it has some limitations. First, it has 
been uniquely focused on the manifestations of attack activities 
that could be observable by the IDS while ignoring completely 
other descriptive attributes that could be operationally so 
important such as: the consequences, the privileges required or 
obtained and the source of attacks. Such attributes are necessary 
for the configuration of evaluation platform and also to determine 
where/how the generated attack test cases will be injected. 
Second, it contains very fine grained dimensions even though the 
level of detail attained has minor significance for the tested IDS. 
For instance, the dimension interface object –that contains 24 
types- considers 5 distinctive types related to the application 
layer: 
App. layer-connectionless;  
App. layer-single connection-single transaction; 
App. layer-single connection-multiple transaction;  
App. layer-multiple connection-single transaction; 
App. layer-multiple connection-multiple transaction. 
As a result of this fine granularity, it is not amazing to find classes 
with one or two attacks. We can relax this attribute by considering 
that an IDS is whether aware of and can analyze the activities at 
the application layer or not and whatever it is a multiple 
connection or single transaction. The worst case that this might 
affect the number of generated alerts. This could be treated when 
we analyze the evaluation results. Thus it does not worth to be 
included in the classification scheme with the advantage of much 
less classes. To explain this, we can theoretically obtain about 
9600 test cases (i.e., all possible combinations), since any 
arbitrary combination of activity characteristic can be used. The 
number could be reduced to 8000 if we merged the classes related 
to the application layer into one class.  
The conclusion of our analysis and discussion is that the currently 
existing attack classifications and taxonomies are not appropriate 
for the evaluation and testing of IDS for several reasons. First, 
they often take the attacker not the IDS (the defense) viewpoint 
and have attributes out of the scope of the IDS. Second, they have 
ambiguous, inconsistently defined attributes and hence problem of 
mutual exclusion. Third, they have a huge number of classes. 
Fourth, there is no accompanying scheme for test case selection. 
 In the rest of the paper we will present a new classification of 
attacks that aims to avoid the previous shortcomings. It builds on 
the previous work by keeping only the attributes judged to be 
relevant for IDS testing, giving them meaningful names and 
consistent definitions. We also avoided the ambiguous attributes 
and eliminated the attributes that are out of the IDS scope. 
Finally, we combined the new classification with a simple scheme 
for test case selection (i.e., the classification tree method) to get 
relevant test cases of representative attacks. 
4. TOWARDS A NEW CLASSIFICATION 
Amongst the critiques of DARPA's evaluations, which hold also 
for almost all subsequent IDS-evaluations, was the criteria 
according to which attacks was selected as test cases [1].  
In this section we state the required characteristics of good 
classifications followed by a suggestion of a new taxonomy of 
attacks. Having a good classification of attacks that takes the 
evaluator’s viewpoint will be extremely useful for several reasons:  
First, it will reduce drastically the number of necessary test cases. 
Second, more comprehensive evaluation could be obtained 
because selective generation of test-cases according to a good 
classification will provide better coverage of attacks. To explain 
that, let us consider the random selection of attack test-cases. 
Evaluators usually test their systems in an ad-hoc manner using 
few attack scripts available in their hands or on security mailing 
lists. However, the available attack scripts do not reflect the attack 
distributions or even do not cover some critical attack types. Some 
IDS evaluations such as [11] and [18] were accompanied by some 
kind of taxonomy but they are either superficial or reporting-
centric taxonomies that are less suitable for IDS evaluations. 
Third, expressing the results of the evaluation in terms of attack 
types will provide a more precise image of results with respect to 
particular types of attacks. For example, a misunderstanding could 
arise from the generalization of conclusions when expressing the 
results for all attacks included in test-cases whereas the tested IDS 
is weak in detecting certain type of attacks and strong in detecting 
another. 
Before proceeding, it is worth to mention here that we use the 
terms: class, type and category as synonyms. The terms: attribute, 
axe and dimension are used interchangeably to signify the feature 
or the criteria of classification.  
4.1 Classification Requirements 
In order to obtain a good classification, there are some general 
requirements that should be satisfied. Such requirements of a 
reasonable classification were stated in [7], [14], and [16]. The 
most important ones are:  
1. Completeness/exhaustive: it means that a categorization 
scheme should take into account all possible attacks (e.g., 
known and unknown).  
2. Clear and unambiguous criteria: if each dimension has a 
number of distinct classes, an attack can be classified by 
picking up one and only one distinct class from each 
dimension. 
3. Mutually exclusive: to ensure that an attack is placed at most 
in one category, a dimension has only mutual exclusive 
distinct classes.  
4. Repeatable: The clear steps followed to classify an attack 
ensure that it should be placed always in the same category. 
5. Compliance with existing standards and terminology: since 
vulnerability databases and dictionaries had become de facto 
standard in security, it was included in our taxonomy. This 
dimension has a great importance because vulnerabilities 
have a tight relation with attacks. 
6. Extensible: when new attack classes appear, the 
categorization scheme should be able to classify them. In our 
scheme, new dimensions can be added and existing 
dimensions can be extended. For instance, the target and the 
carrier dimensions could be widened to contain more targets 
and more carriers respectively. Therefore, even theoretical 
attacks, that do not exist yet or not known yet could be 
considered. 
Knowledge about attacks is continuously increasing, but it still 
practically insufficient to establish such taxonomy that satisfies all 
the aforementioned requirements. In this regard, we follow a 
pragmatic approach to do so and assign it a moderate priority in 
our interest. On the other hand, our classification is fully 
supporting the following requirements. 
Evaluation-related requirements: In addition to the general 
requirements, we can identify two more requirements that are 
important from the evaluation perspective: 
1. It should have a complementary scheme for attack selection 
because multidimensional classifications are more 
complicated and usually have thousands of classes. 
Therefore, a classification scheme should be complemented 
by a clear approach for wise selection of attacks. 
2. It should consider attack generation aspects: It should be 
kept in mind that attacks are classified and consequently test 
cases are selected in order to be generated during the 
evaluation process.  
4.2 Suggesting New Classification 
As stated previously, the purpose of this classification is to be 
used in the evaluation and testing of IDS. Therefore, attacks are 
viewed from the perspective of the IDS itself. We examined 
carefully the attributes mentioned in section 3 to determine which 
attributes are significant. Issues that are invisible for IDS or 
meaningless for it should be discarded. For example, dimensions 
such as attacker’s objective (intention) will not be treated 
anymore within this classification since it is both hard and useless 
to reveal attackers intention. Beside that, we see any attack 
attempt or intrusion as a serious threat, whatever the objectives 
behind. Similarly, both the type and detection technique 
dimensions do not provide precise, clear cut categories. 
While the results and security property (security threat) 
dimensions give an indication about the expected damage, it is out 
of the IDS scope according to the assumptions stated below. It can 
be investigated later by correlation and forensic tools. 
Furthermore, once attackers have hands over your system 
(especially if they managed to have root/administrative access), 
they can do what they like; they can steal, modify or destroy 
information and hence having a serious threat to the 
confidentiality, the integrity and the availability respectively. 
Based on the analysis that we made in the previous sections and 
regarding the stated requirements, we have adopted a new 
classification inspired from the previous classifications [7], [12], 
[13], [14], [16]. 
Our taxonomy relies on two main assumptions. First, we define 
the task of an IDS as "to detect and to identify any attack or 
intrusion attempt, whether the attack was successful or not". The 
second assumption is that IDS is concerned mainly with atomic 
attacks. Composite and multi-stage attacks could be detected but 
in terms of individual attacks that comprise it. The correlation 
between alerts corresponding to the atomic attacks is supposed to 
signal a composite one or a scenario of attack. 
Figure 1 shows our five-dimension taxonomy. The dimensions are 
selected carefully to cover attack manifestations, sources and 
origins. The dimensions are:  
1. firing source that indicates the place from which the attacks 
are launched. It has two distinct classes: remote and local. 
This will determine the place from which an attack test case 
will be launched. It can help to decide which the placement 
and type of IDS is appropriate (e.g., which network segment, 
host-based or network-based). It is also important to evaluate 
the capacity of the evaluated IDS to detect remote as well as 
local attacks.  
2. privilege escalation: regarding whether the attack results in 
promoting the access level. The distinct class root means that 
the attacker has gained a root/administration access. The 
distinct class user implies that the access level gained after 
the attack is a user access. System is the third distinct class 
for attacks that enables the execution of processes with 
system rights. The distinct class none covers attacks that do 
not need or do not result in any access to the system. This 
includes most of remote DoS attacks and reconnaissance or 
scanning attacks.  
3. vulnerability dimension: was particularly added to express 
the relationship between attacks and vulnerability 
databases/dictionary and to precise the exploited 
vulnerability. It can point to the specific vulnerability that is 
exploited by the attacks that belong to this class. But for 
now, we precise only whether the vulnerability is due to 
configuration or design/ implementation flaws. 
4. the carrier dimension explains the means by which the attack 
was carried out: either via network traffic or through an 
action performed directly on the machine and does not 
appear on the network interface.  
5. the last dimension is the targeted object. Attackers may 
target the memory, the operating system, the network stack, a 
file system object or a process (which represent the distinct 
classes of the target dimension). 
Our taxonomy do not focus only on the observable characteristics 
of attacks like did the defense-centric [15] and the IDS-centric 
[16] taxonomies. The added value of this taxonomy is that it 
allows the classification of attacks regarding their characteristics 
observable by IDS while keeping the eye on the operational issues 
important for administrators. For example, the severity of attacks 
is reflected implicitly by privilege escalation dimension. Also, the 
source of danger (i.e., the firing source and the vulnerability 
types) could suggest how the danger could be alleviated by which 
counter measure (e.g., modify firewall rules to block a remote 
source or search a missed patch). Moreover, it does not ignore the 
evaluators’ needs where it provides essential information for the 
generation of attacks and the analysis of test data. For example, 
the firing source dimension gives an idea about the place from 
which an attack should be generated, and the vulnerability 
dimension tells whether a particular configuration should be 
set/unset.  
Ideally, an IDS should behave (i.,e., detect, undetect) in the same 
way against attacks of the same class. Thus, it will be sufficient to 
include a single attack from each class in the test case suite. To 
check this “strong” assumption, two cases can be distinguished. 
First: assuming that our classification is perfect: when we inject 
attacks of the same class (i.e., they have the same attributes, 
manifestations, etc.), the IDS will ideally behave similarly for all 
attack instances. Otherwise, if the IDS behave differently, we can 
conclude that the IDS has a problem of implementation and/or 
configuration. Consider signature-based IDS, by example, it may 
lack the corresponding signature of some attacks. The second 
case: assuming that neither the IDS nor the classification are 
perfect. As this is likely the case, we should search a compromise. 
To ensure the representativity of attacks in the test suite, we need 
to extend it with several instances of attacks of the same type and 
then make statistics on the detection /non-detection results. This 
will increase the number of test cases but at the same time it will 
enhance the quality and certainty of results. 
Finally, there might be some empty classes, but we do not 
consider it as a limitation. Contrarily, this may demonstrates the 
extensibility of the classification as future attacks can fit into the 
empty classes. 
 
5. A SCHEME FOR TEST-CASE 
SELECTION 
Having presented the evaluation-oriented classification, how 
could it be employed for the evaluation and test of IDS? In this 
section we present an approach by which evaluators can select 
relevant test cases. 
5.1 Classification Tree Method 
The classification-tree method (CTM) was developed by 
Grotchamann and Grimm in [17]. By means of the CTM, the 
input domain of a test object is regarded under various aspects 
that are assessed to be relevant for the test. For each aspect, 
disjoint and complete classifications are formed. Classes resulting 
from these classifications may be further classified. The stepwise 
partition of the input domain by means of classifications is 
represented graphically in the form of a tree. Subsequently, test 
cases are formed by combining classes of different dimensions.  
To construct the test-cases, a grid is drawn below the tree. The 
columns of the grid result from vertical lines that correspond to 
the leaves of the classification tree. A tester can construct a test 
case by selecting a single child class of each top-level 
classification. Each row of the grid indicates a distinct category of 
test case. However, not all test cases are legal or valid. Therefore, 
the tester should identify all valid test cases and eliminate invalid 
ones. This often could be done by applying the constraints stated 
explicitly or implicitly in system specifications. 
A major advantage of the classification-tree method is that it turns 
test case selection and generation into a systematic process and 
making it easy to handle. Moreover, the systematic generation and 
analysis of test cases prevents the overlook that might occur for 
some areas of input. Thanks to its graphical representation, it 
allows the visualization of ideas and could be a good mean of 
communication between testers and developers. 
In order to generate the possible test cases we used a tool called 
CTE (Classification Tree Editor) [4] which enables the automatic 
generation of test cases. 
5.2 Generation of Attack Test Cases Using 
CTM 
Given the attack classification tree and using the classification tree 
method (CTM), the CTE tool can produce all the possible 
combinations of the distinct subclasses from all the dimensions. 
Figure 1. The suggested new taxonomy 
Attack Firing Source
Pivilege Escalation
Vulnerability
Carrier
Target
Remote
Local
None
System
User
Root
Implementation
Configuration
Network Traffic
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Network Layer
Transport Layer
Application Layer
System Call
Environment
Command Execute/ 
Function Call
Process
File System
Socket 
Communication
Operating System
Memory
Network Stack
Process
File System Object
These combinations represent possible attack test cases.  
The number of combinations may be in the range of thousands 
(more precisely 1920 test cases compared to 9600 in [16]) and 
exhaustively covers the attack space. However, the test cases can 
be reduced, regrouped and reordered to get only relevant test 
cases by applying constraints or generation rules in CTE.  
The syntax for expressing the constraints within the program CTE 
is straight forward. In addition to the dimension or the attribute 
name, it uses the logic operators (AND (*), OR (+) and NOT) and 
the parentheses. For example, the following generation rule (i.e., 
constraint):  
Remote * (root +system) * configuration vul * Network traffic * ( 
FS object + OS) 
will result in 16 test case categories, which represent remote 
attacks that provide root or system access by exploiting 
configuration vulnerability and could be observed in network 
traffic targeting the files system or the operating system (see 
appendix A). 
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper argued that an evaluation oriented classification of 
attacks is needed. We demonstrated that the existing 
classifications and taxonomies do not match all the needs of IDS 
evaluation and testing. To fill this gap, we proposed a new 
categorization scheme to be used by IDS evaluators and by 
network administrators to assess and test their IDS. Based on this 
classification and using the classification tree method, we 
introduced an approach to wisely select relevant attack test cases. 
Therefore, attack selection for IDS evaluation is no longer random 
or done blindly from the few attacks at hand. It can now be done 
with respect to the whole attack space. The next step is to classify 
the existing attacks and exploits in order to populate the test cases 
by real attacks. Then, we will proceed toward our ultimate goal as 
this enables the unbiased evaluations of Intrusion Detection 
Systems. This will be the subject of our next research.  
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